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Abstract
By and large, existing Intellectual Property Right (IPR) protection on deep neural
networks typically i) focus on image classification task only, and ii) follow a
standard digital watermarking framework that were conventionally used to protect
the ownership of multimedia and video content. This paper demonstrates that
current digital watermarking framework is insufficient to protect image captioning
task that often regarded as one of the frontier A.I. problems. As a remedy, this
paper studies and proposes two different embedding schemes in the hidden memory
state of a recurrent neural network to protect image captioning model. From both
theoretically and empirically points, we prove that a forged key will yield an
unusable image captioning model, defeating the purpose on infringement. To the
best of our knowledge, this work is the first to propose ownership protection on
image captioning task. Also, extensive experiments show that the proposed method
does not compromise the original image captioning performance on all common
captioning metrics on Flickr30k and MS-COCO datasets, and at the same time it is
able to withstand both removal and ambiguity attacks.
1 Introduction
Recent advances in deep neural network (DNN) had significantly improved the overall model
performance in multiple artificial intelligence (A.I.) domains, for example natural language processing,
computer vision, gaming and etc. As a result of this, it has enable a growing number of A.I. start-ups
and companies to offer their DNN solutions in terms of Software as a Service (SaaS). As such, the
protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) of DNN has became a necessity in order to protect
the model against IP infringement to preserve the owner’s competitive advantage in an open market.
For the past few years, IPR protection on DNN [1–8] has been a significant research area. Ideally,
the goal is the IPR protection solution should not degrade the performance of the original model,
and at the same time, it must also resilient against ambiguity and removal attacks. Although, all
these existing solutions have achieved this goal, it is unsatisfactory in our view as we found out that
all existing DNN watermarking methods have been i) following a standard digital watermarking
framework that were conventionally used to protect the ownership of multimedia and video content,
and ii) focusing on DNNs for classification tasks that map images to labels, and DNNs for other tasks
are forgotten such as image captioning that map images to texts.
A natural question is then why not directly apply existing watermarking methods [1, 8] designed for
the classification DNNs to watermark the DNNs in image captioning. Unfortunately, it is not the
case for the white-box watermarking methods. The obstacles lie in several fundamental differences
Preprint. Under review.
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Methods
MS-COCO Flickr30k
CIDEr-D SPICE CIDEr-D SPICE
Baseline 94.30 17.44 41.80 11.98
Passport [8] 84.45 15.32 28.22 9.98
(↓10.45%) (↓12.16%) (↓32.49%) (↓16.69%)
Proposed 93.93 17.53 41.83 11.87
(↓0.39%) (↑0.52%) (↑0.07%) (↓0.92%)
Table 1: Comparison of baseline, passport [8] and
proposed model on two public datasets. It shows
that [8] is insufficient to be deployed to protect
the IPR of image captioning task as compared to
our proposed model, against the baseline.
Baseline: a couple of people standing next to a
giraffe
Passport [8]: a group of giraffes
Proposed: a group of people standing next to a
giraffe
Figure 1: Comparison in terms of the quality of
caption generated. It can be noticed that the cap-
tion generated by [8] is incomplete and incorrect;
while the caption generated from our model is
very near to the baseline.
between these two kinds of DNNs. First, DNNs for classification output a label. In contrast, DNNs
for image captioning output a sentence. Second, classification is about finding the decision boundaries
among different classes, whereas image captioning is not only to understand the image content in
depth beyond category or attribute levels, but also to connect its interpretation with a language model
to create a natural sentence [9]. We demonstrated in Table 1-2, Figure 1-3 and Sect. 4.2 that a recent
digital watermarking framework [8] that used to protect deep-based classification model is insufficient
to protect image captioning models.
As a remedy, this paper proposes a novel embedding framework that consist of two different embed-
ding schemes to embed an unique secret key into the recurrent neural network (RNN) cell [10] to
protect the image captioning model against various attacks. Specifically, with a theoretical proof, we
show that embed secret key into the hidden memory state of a RNN is the best choice for the image
captioning task such that a forged key will immediately yield an unusable image captioning model in
terms of poor quality outputs, defeating the purpose on infringement.
On the one hand, our solution bears a similarity to digital watermarking - they both embed certain
digital entities into models during training sessions. In terms of the IPRs protection, however,
embedded watermarks only enable the verification of the ownership of models. One has to rely
on government investigation and enforcing actions to discourage the IPRs infringement. Whether
this kind of approaches can provide reliable, timely and cost effective juridical protection remain
questionable. On the other hand, our key-protected models will not function normally unless the
valid key is provided, thus immediately preventing the unlawful usages of the models with no extra
costs. Indeed, we regard this proactive protection the most prominent advantage of our solution over
digital watermarking. For instance, in Fig. 4, the protected model with valid key demonstrated almost
identical performance as that of the original model, while the same model presented with a forged
key has a huge performance drop in all metric scores.
The contributions are threefold: i) We renovate the paradigm of digital watermarking based neural
network IP protection, by proposing a key based strategy which provides reliable, preventive and
timely IP protection (Sect. 3.1) at virtually no extra cost (Sect. 4.6) for image captioning task. ii) This
paper formulates the problem and proposes a generic solution as well as concrete implementation
schemes that embed unique key into RNN models through hidden memory state (Section 3; Fig. 2b).
We theoretically prove that a forged key will yield an useless image model. Also, we empirically
show the effectiveness of the proposed approach against various attacks and prove the ownership of
the model (Sect. 4); and iii) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose IPR protection
on image captioning model and we demonstrated that the proposed method does not compromise
the original image captioning performance on all common captioning metrics on Flickr30k and
MS-COCO datasets (Table 2).
2 Related work
Conventionally, digital watermarks were extensively used in protecting the ownership of multimedia
contents, including images, videos, audio, or functional designs. It is a process of embedding a
marker into the content, and subsequently using it to verify the ownership. In deep learning, the IPR
protection on the models can be categorised into i) white-box based solution [1, 2], ii) black-box
based solution [3–6] or iii) a combinatorial of both white and black based solution [7, 8].
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The first work that introduced digital watermarks for DNN was proposed by Uchida et al. [1], where
the authors embedded a watermark into the weights parameters via parameter regularizer during the
training as white-box protection. For verification, owners are required to access the model parameters
to extract the watermark. To remedy this issue, [3–6] proposed digital watermarks in a black-box
setting. In this setting, a set of trigger set images are generated as random image and label pairs.
During training, the feature distributions of those images are distant from the labeled training samples.
During verification, the trigger set watermark can be extracted remotely without the need to access
the model weights. For example, Zhang et al. [3] introduced three different key generations which
are content-based, noise-based, and unrelated-based images respectively. Adi et al. [4] proposed
a watermarking method similar to [3] but their main contribution is the model verification. While,
Merrer et al. [6] proposed to use adversarial examples as the watermark key set to modify the model
decision boundary.
Recently, [7, 8] presented a watermarking framework that works in both white-box and black-box
settings. Rouhani et al. [7] embedded watermark in activation of selected layers of the DNN by
integrating two additional regularization loss terms, binary cross-entropy loss, and Gaussian Mixed
Model (GMM) agent loss. It is robust against pruning, fine-tuning, and overwriting attack but require
more computation. The work that most closer to us is Fan et al. [8] added special "passport" layers
into DNN model to enable ownership verification. With a forged passport, the performance of the
model will be significantly deteriorated. This design relies on the secrecy of passport layer weights
that requires the owner to keep the passport layer weights secret from attacker. However, empirically,
we demonstrated that [8] does not able to protect image captioning model effectively.
3 Proposed approach
Our image captioning framework of interest is a simplified variant of the Show, Attend and Tell
model [9]. It is a popular framework that forms the basis for subsequent state-of-the-art works on
image captioning [11, 12].
Unless otherwise stated, our models are trained under the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)
framework, where the probability of generating a correct caption of length T with tokens
{S0, · · · , ST−1} for an image I is directly maximised:
log p (S | I) =
T∑
t= 0
log p (St | I, S0 : t−1, ct) (1)
where t is the time step, p (St | I, S0 : t−1, ct) is the probability of generating a word given an image
I , previous words S0 : t−1, and context vector ct.
3.1 Problem formulation
Let N denote a image captioning model to be protected by a secret key k, after a training process,
the image captioning model embedded with the key is denoted by N [K]. The inference of such a
protected model can be characterized as a process M that modifies the model behavior according to
the running-time key l:
M(N [K], l) =
{ MK , if l = K,
MK¯ , otherwise, (2)
in whichMK is the network performance with key correctly verified, andMK¯ is the performance
with the incorrect key i.e. K¯ 6= K.
The properties of M(N [K], l) defined below are desired for the sake of IPR protection:
Definition 1. If l = K, the performanceMK should be as close as possible to that of the original
network N . Specifically, if the performance inconsistency betweenMK and that of N is smaller
than a desired threshold, then the protected network is called functionality-preserving.
Definition 2. If l 6= K, on the other hand, the performanceMK¯ should be as far as possible to that
ofMk. The discrepancy betweenMK andMK¯ therefore can be defined as the protection-strength.
3.2 Embedding operation
Figure 2b shows the overview of the proposed approach. Our embedding process can be represented as
EO
(
D,g,N [.], L) = N [W,g], is a RNN learning process. It takes inputs training dataD = {I, S},
3
(a) Original LSTM Cell (b) LSTM Cell with Secret Key Embedding
Figure 2: An overview of the proposed approach. (a) The original LSTM Cell and (b) LSTM Cell
with key embedding operation O ∈ {M⊕, M⊗} (see Section 3.2)
and optionally signature g, and optimizes the modelN [W,g] by minimizing the given loss L. In this
paper, we introduce two different key embedding operations O which are i) element-wise addition
model (M⊕) or ii) element-wise multiplication model (M⊗):
O(K,ht−1, e) =
{
K ⊕ ht−1, if e = ⊕,
K ⊗ ht−1, else. (3)
kf = {kf,i}Ni=1 with N is the size of the hidden state, kf,i ∈ R : −1 ≤ kf,i ≤ 1 and kb = {kb,i}Ni=1
with kb,i ∈ {−1, 1}.
Then, the embedded keyK is represented in terms kb is generated by converting the string provided by
owner to a binary vector BE. However, we found out that binary vector for very near alphanumeric,
e.g. string A and C has only 1-bit difference. Therefore, we proposed a new transformation function
T:
T(BE,BC) = BE ⊗BC = kb (4)
where BC is a binary vector sampled from value of -1 or 1 according to the seed provided by user, to
alleviate this issue.
3.3 Sign of hidden state as signature
In order to further strengthen our model, we follow [8] to add the sign loss regularization term into
the loss function as:
Lg(h,G, γ) =
N∑
i=1
max(γ − higi, 0) (5)
where G = {gi}Ni=1 with gi ∈ {−1, 1} consists of the designated binary bits for hidden state h. To
enforce the hidden state to have magnitude greater than 0, a hyperparameter γ is introduced in the
sign loss. However, one of the main difference of our approach compare to [8] is our signature is
not embedded in the model weights, but it is embedded in the hidden state which is the output of
the LSTM cell. This is because we found out that embedding signature in the model weights can be
easily attacked with a channel permutation, i.e. change the signature but remains the output of the
model (please see supp. material for results).
3.4 Ownership verification
Suppose an owner tries to verify the ownership of a target model, three verification methods are
proposed: 1) V1: Key-based verification; and 2) V2: Signature-based verification.
V1: Secret key-based verification - In this verification scheme, there are two different approaches,
depending on the secret key is either public or private. Formerly, the trained model and the public
key will be provided to the clients. For model inferences, the public key will be required as part of
the input to the model to ensure the model performance is preserved. The ownership of the model
can be verified directly by the provided key. Latter, a private key is directly embedded into the model.
For inference, only image is required as the model input. However, for ownership verification, one
has to have access to the model and extract the key from the LSTM cell.
V2: Signature verification - In this verification scheme, an unique signature is embedded in the sign
of the hidden state during training process via sign loss regularization. To verify the signature, owner
is required to access the trained model. Then, an image will be sent to the model to generate caption.
During inference time, the sign of hidden state of the LSTM cell will be extracted and compared with
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Methods
MS-COCO Flickr30k
B-1 B-2 B-3 B-4 M R C S B-1 B-2 B-3 B-4 M R C S
Baseline 72.14 55.70 41.86 31.14 24.18 52.92 94.30 17.44 63.40 45.18 31.68 21.90 18.04 44.30 41.80 11.98
Passport [8] 68.50 53.30 38.41 29.12 21.03 48.80 84.45 15.32 48.30 38.23 26.21 17.88 15.02 32.25 28.22 9.98
M⊕ 72.53 56.07 42.03 30.97 24.00 52.90 ∗91.40 ∗17.13 62.43 44.40 30.90 21.13 ∗17.53 43.63 ∗40.07 ∗11.57
M⊗ ∗72.47 ∗56.03 ∗41.97 ∗30.90 ∗23.97 52.90 91.60 17.17 ∗62.30 ∗44.07 ∗30.73 ∗21.10 17.63 ∗43.53 40.17 11.67
Table 2: Comparison between proposed approaches (M⊕,M⊗) with baseline and Passport [8] on
MS-COCO and Flickr30k datasets, across 5 common metrics where B-N, M, R, C and S are BLEU-N,
METEOR, ROUGE-L, CIDEr-D and SPICE scores. BOLD is best result and ∗ is second best result.
(a) two dogs are laying on a
bed.
(b) two dogs are laying on a bed.
(c) two dogs are laying on a bed.
(d) two dogs.
(a) a man is pouring a drink.
(b) a man is pouring a drink.
(c) a man is pouring a drink.
(d) a drink.
(a) a plate of food on a table.
(b) a plate of food on a table.
(c) a bowl of food sitting on a
table.
(b) a bowl on a table.
(a) a blue and white airplane
flying in the sky.
(b) a white plane flying in the sky.
(c) a plane is flying in the sky.
(d) a plane in the sky.
Figure 3: Comparison of captions generated by (a) Baseline, (b) M⊕ (c) M⊗, and (d) Passport [8]. It
is noticed that the quality of the captions generated by our models is very close to the baseline.
our signature to verify the ownership. This binary bits signature can be transformed back to a human
readable string for example the name of the owner.
4 Experiments
This section presents the experiment results of the proposed approaches in terms of resilient to
ambiguity and robustness to removal attacks. Qualitative analysis is also carried out to compare the
quality of the caption generated by different approaches. The baseline model is implemented based
on the soft attention model as to [9]. We used ResNet-50 as the encoder and LSTM as our language
generator. The dimension of the embedding and hidden state are set to 512. The LSTM decoder is
trained using learning rate of 1e-4 for 8 epochs and finetune the CNN with learning rate of 1e-5 up to
20 epochs. The model is trained by cross-entropy loss using Adam [13] optimizer with mini-batch
size of 32. We repeated all experiments for 3 times to get the average performance. Beam size is set
as 3 in the inference stage.
4.1 Dataset and metrics
We train and evaluate our proposed approaches on the MS-COCO [14] and Flickr30k [15] datasets,
which are widely used for image captioning task. We followed the widely used split in [16] for both
datasets. MS-COCO contains 113,287 training images with 5 human annotated captions for each
image. The validation and test sets contain 5,000 images each. Flickr30k contains 1,000 images for
validation, 1,000 for test, and the rest for training. We truncated captions longer than 20 words and
converted all the words into lower case. A fixed vocabulary size of 10,000 is used for both datasets.
We evaluate our proposed approaches using all common metrics in image captioning task: CIDEr-
D [17], SPICE [18], BLEU [19], METEOR [20], and ROUGE-L [21]. However, CIDEr-D and SPICE
have shown to have a higher correlation with human judgments compared to BLEU and ROUGE.
4.2 Comparison with CNN-based watermarking framework
For a comparison with existing digital watermarking framework, we re-implement [8] using the
official repository and refer this model as Passport. We choose [8] because the work is somehow
similar to us in terms of technical implementation. In Table 2, we can notice that the overall
performance of the Passport model on both MS-COCO and Flickr30k is very poor compared with the
baseline and our proposed methods. For example, the CIDEr-D score dropped 10.45% (MS-COCO)
and 32.49% (Flickr30K), respectively when compared to the baseline. In contrast, both of our
proposed methods only dropped 3-4% on both MS-COCO and Flickr30K when compared to the
baseline. Furthermore, we conducted an experiment to attack the Passport model with a forged
passport and found out the Passport model still can have a relatively high CIDEr-D score of 83.0 and
26.5 on MS-COCO and Flickr30k (see suppl. material for more details).
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Figure 4: CIDEr-D on Flickr30k and MS-COCO under ambiguity attack on (a-b) key; (c-d) signature.
Methods
MS-COCO Flickr30k
MS-COCO Flickr30k Flickr30k MS-COCO
Baseline - (94.30) - (37.70) - (41.80) - (88.50)
M⊕ 100 (91.40) 70.40 (37.50) 100 (40.07) 72.50 (87.30)
M⊗ 99.99 (91.60) 71.50 (37.8) 99.99 (40.17) 71.35 (86.50)
Table 3: Fine-tuning attack: CIDEr-D (in-
bracket) of baseline and proposed models (Left:
MS-COCO fine-tune on Flickr30k. Right: vice-
versa.) Accuracy (%) outside bracket is signa-
ture detection rate.
Methods
MSCOCO Flickr30k
Unique Avg. length Unique Avg. length
Baseline 62.93% 8.86 88.80% 9.50
M⊕ 70.96% 8.81 88.00% 9.30
M⊗ 70.26% 8.91 87.10% 9.28
M̂⊕ 100.00% 19.97 97.40% 18.56
M̂⊗ 88.44% 12.71 53.40% 7.69
Table 4: Comparison on uniqueness of caption
generated by proposed approaches and base-
line model. M̂⊕ and M̂⊗ are M⊕ and M⊗,
respectively but with forged secret key.
In terms of qualitative comparison, Fig. 3 shows the sample captions generated by Passport model is
relatively brief when compared to the baseline and our proposed approaches (see suppl. material for
more results). For instance, the first image in Fig. 3, our proposed model generated two dogs are
laying on a bed, it matches with the groundtruth provided by the baseline, but Passport model only
generated two dogs, missing the rest of the rich context altogether. Similar observation is found for
the rest of the image. As a conclusion, we deduce that conventional digital watermarking framework
is insufficient to protect image captioning model.
4.3 Fidelity Evaluation
Fidelity is defined as matching the performance of the original model. In this section, we show
that our proposed embedding schemes do not degrade the overall model performance in terms of
metric, as well as the quality of the generated sentences. According to Table 2, it shows that the
overall performance of the proposed approaches and baseline model on MS-COCO and Flickr30k
in all 5 image captioning metrics. Specifically, we can observe that M⊕ performed the best as it
out-performed baseline in BLEU1-3 score on MS-COCO dataset, and BLEU-1 in Flickr30K dataset,
respectively. For the rest of the metric score, we can also observed that M⊕ came as 2nd best score.
In contrast, [8] performed poorly with at least 10% drop in all metrics.
Subsequently Table 4 shows the comparison on the uniqueness of generated caption from the proposed
approaches and baseline model. A caption is considered as unique if the generated caption does not
exist in training dataset. On both dataset, it shows that our proposed approaches have very similar
uniqueness and average caption length compared to baseline. This is consistent with the caption
generated shown in Figure 3. For example, both of our models have an exact caption generated as
to baseline on the the first image. And subsequently, in the rest of the images, the choice of words
generated (i.e. food, table, flying, sky) are also very consistent with the baseline.,
4.4 Resilience against ambiguity attacks
Protection against forged key
In this case, we assume the attacker somehow has the access to the model but does not have the correct
secret key and so tries to attack the model with a random forged key. Figure 4(a-b) show CIDEr-D
score of proposed models under ambiguity attack on the secret key in Flickr30k and MS-COCO.
Accordingly, we can observe that in general, the model performance will drop when a forged key
is deployed. In particular, we would like to highlight that CIDEr-D score on MS-COCO drops
significantly (almost 50% difference) in M⊗ even a forged key that has a 75% similarity to the real
key is being deployed. This shows that our proposed method is resilient against this forged key attack.
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(a) a young boy in a blue shirt is standing in
a field
(b) a young boy in a blue shirt is standing in a
field
(c) a young boy in a blue shirt
(d) a group
(a) a shelf with vases and vases on display
(b) a shelf filled with different vases on a shelf
(c) a shelf with a glass case
(d) a shelf with a glass shelf on a shelf on a
shelf on a shelf on a shelf on a
(a) a group of people riding skis on a snow
covered slope
(b) a group of people on a snow covered
slope
(c) a person on a snow covered slope
(d) a person on the snow
Figure 5: Comparison of captions generated from (a) Baseline, (b) M⊗, (c) M⊗ with the forged key
has 75% similarity as to real key and (d) M⊗ with the forged key has 50% similarity as to real key.
(a) a boy in a red shirt is
walking down a sidewalk.
(b) a young boy in a red shirt is
walking down a sidewalk.
(c) a young boy in a small boy in
a small boy in a small child in a
small child in.
(a) two men are sitting on a
street.
(b) two men are sitting on the
street.
(c) a group of people in a group
of people.
(a) a group of people walking
around a street.
(b) a city street with lots of
people on it.
(c) a city street in a city street.
(a) a girl sitting on a table with
a cake.
(b) a girl sitting in front of a table.
(c) a girl in a small child in a
small child in a small a small
child in a small.
Figure 6: Comparison of captions from (a) Baseline, (b,c) M⊗, M⊗ with 50% signs polarity toggled.
Figure 5 shows another four sample images (see suppl. material for more results), and the respective
captions generated by our proposal and baseline. From the first image, it shows that given the
correct secret key, our proposed method is able to generate caption that consists of object, scene,
and attributes that is very similar to baseline. When a forged key is used, in this example, we show
in Figure 5(c) a forged key that has a 90% similarity to the correct secret key and in Figure 5(d)
another forged key that has a 50% matching to the correct secret key, the generated caption is either
not meaningful at all with repetitive words (i.e. shelf on a shelf) or a very brief caption (i.e., a
group). According to Table 4, we can also observe similar patterns. For instance, M̂⊕ has almost
100% uniqueness with the longest average caption length on both datasets. From Figure 5, we can
understand that this is due to repetitive words. Meanwhile, M̂⊗ has 88.44% uniqueness with the
shortest average caption length on Flick30K dataset. Yet again, this phenomena is observed from the
generated caption in Figure 5.
Protection against fake signature
In this case, we assume the secret key is exposed to the attacker and one can use the model with
original performance. However, the signature is able to use as a proof of ownership. As such, the
attacker will try to attack the signature by attempting to change the sign of the signature. Figure
4(c-d) show the overall performance of our proposed models (CIDEr-D score) will decrease when the
signature is being compromised on both Flickr30k and MS-COCO. For instance, even a very small
changes (only 10% of the sign are toggle), we can observe at least a 10-15% drop of performance in
terms of CIDEr-D score; and when half of the sign are toggle, it is seen that the model performance
is almost useless (see suppl. material for more results).
4.5 Robustness against removal attacks
Model pruning
Generally, model pruning is used to reduce the weights and computation overhead of a DNN model.
However, the attacker might leverage it to remove the signature in the model. In order to test our
proposed approaches is robust to this attack, we implemented class-blind pruning method [22]. Figure
7 shows the CIDEr-D score and signature detection rate on M⊕ and M⊗ against different pruning
rates. We show that even 60% of the network parameters are pruned, the signature detection rate
is still intact at more that 84% and 91% on both Flickr30k and MS-COCO datasets, respectively.
Similar observation is also found on the CIDEr-D score (see suppl. material for more results).
Fine-tuning
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Figure 7: Removal attack (Pruning): CIDEr-D score and signature detection rate of our proposed
approaches on both MS-COCO and Flickr30k against different pruning rates.
Here, we simulate an attacker fine-tune the stolen model with a new dataset to obtain a new model
that inherits the performance of the stolen model while try to remove the embedded signature. Table 3
shows the signature detection rate and CIDEr-D score of the proposed model after perform fine-tuning.
The signature can be detected almost to 100% accuracy for the proposed approaches in the original
task. After fine-tuning the model (e.g., from MS-COCO to Flickr30k or Flickr30k to MS-COCO), we
show that the proposed approaches achieve comparable CIDEr-D score as to the baseline, however
we observe the signature detection rate decreased to around 70%. This is one of the limitation of the
proposed method but overall it does not compromise the IPR protection of the model as we still have
the secret key to act as a proof of ownership. Therefore, the proposed secret key working together
with signature in this paper can act as a complete protection for ownership verification.
4.6 Network Complexity
Our proposed approach with the key and signature embedding in the image captioning model does
not cause the extra cost. We conducted an experiment to compare the training and inference time
between baseline, M⊕ and M⊗. All the experiments used TITAN V GPU with the same setting and
hyperparameter as stated in Section 4. On both Flickr30k and MS-COCO dataset, the complexity of
our proposed approach (with the key and signature embedded) compared to baseline model is almost
negligible (only an incremental by 1.89% in training time, see suppl. material for full results).
5 Conclusion
IPR protection on DNN has been a significant research area and we take the first step to implement the
ownership protection on image captioning task. The protection is achieved two different embedding
schemes, using the hidden memory state of RNN so that the image captioning functionalities are
paralyzed for unauthorized usage. We demonstrated with extensive experiments that our proposed,
on the one hand, the image captioning functionalities are well-preserved in the presence of valid
secret key and well-protected for unauthorized usages on the other hand. The proposed key-based
protection is therefore more cost-effective, proactive and timely, as compared with watermarking
based protections which have to rely on government investigation and juridical enforcing actions.
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